in the interim, scowcroft and colleague lawrence eagleburger wanted the president's endorsement with a more vigorous response in here today, more than 20 years later as we discuss the history, we should be frank about what finally moved rush to act. it was not the argument that kuwaiti independence itself mattered much at all. neither was it that hussein's particular brand of evil required an american response, nervous bush particularly persuaded iraq's aggression carried concern so iraq may someday to weapons of mass distraction. each of these reasons in time to influence bush's thought, actions and statements in the midst of time. none however, not freedom from evil, human rights, democracy were wmd affected inking those first days of august. bush was instead, and this is important. bush has been superseded by the realization he stood at a pivotal moment in the course of history. this is my second point. as scowcroft explained in the second national security council meeting, after having time to collect, my personal judgment are such that to accommodate iraq should not be a policy